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INTRODUCTION
For decades, policymakers and the public have condemned the
inadequacy of the law governing punishment for white-collar crimes.1 In
response to this ferment, all three branches of government have transformed
that law. Some reforms have flourished and others have foundered:
determinate sentencing has come and gone, but more sophisticated
frameworks for linking punishment to harm and culpability have emerged
and may continue to develop. Throughout this process, the severity and
scope of recommended carceral penalties for white-collar offenses has
steadily grown, ensuring that stiff punishments await all serious offenders,
in proportion to the harm they have caused. Such changes have likely
increased the deterrence and expressive–retributive effects of the law
governing white-collar crime.
With these reforms in place, it is now time to consider cost-effective,
complementary sanctions designed to encourage prompt victim redress and
socially beneficial behavior. Although prison sentences rightfully play an
important role in the means of punishment mix, incarceration should not
overpower other measures that can limit the adverse societal impacts of
white-collar crime. Such wrongdoing causes economic harm in the first
instance, and punishment for it should aim, at least in significant part, to
efficiently and effectively minimize that harm. Starting from that premise,
this Comment argues that courts and the United States Sentencing
Commission (USSC) should encourage restorative behavior by expanding
formal measures to modestly mitigate carceral punishment when an
offender voluntarily and promptly pays victims restitution.
Restitution is a familiar tool. Court-ordered restitution is used widely
in white-collar cases, and voluntary restitution also plays a background role,
although published decisions rarely acknowledge and examine it. While the
availability of mandatory restitution may appear on its face to obviate the

1

White-collar crime includes such crimes as money laundering, embezzlement, and a
range of fraud offenses (e.g., bankruptcy fraud, corporate fraud, financial institution fraud,
health care fraud, hedge fund fraud, insurance fraud, mass marketing fraud, mortgage fraud,
and securities fraud).
See White-Collar Crime, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://goo.gl/bHS5jc (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).

2014]

AUTOCORRECT?

391

need to encourage offenders to voluntarily repay their victims, a closer look
at existing practices demonstrates that the prevailing mandatory approach is
ineffective. Mechanisms for enforcing restitution judgments are imperfect
at best, collection rates are abysmally low, and offenders use a panoply of
evasive tactics to avoid their obligations.2 Consequently, mandatory
restitution orders may have expressive value, but their restorative effects
tend to fall short of the mark. Their use in lieu of possibly more helpful
alternative measures fails to leverage the power of the courts to induce
remedial, and possibly more socially responsible, behavior.
The policy considerations motivating the drive to incarcerate economic
offenders and expand the use of mandatory restitution have been sound.
Efforts to strengthen the deterrent effect of laws governing economic crimes
and to bring punishments for those crimes into closer alignment with
punishments for “street crimes” have made white-collar prison sentences
fairer, and also more responsive to public assessments of reprehensibility.
In the aftermath of outbreaks of financial mega-crimes, such as the
Adelphia, Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom frauds, sentencing reforms have
ensured that the scale of available punishments has increased to fit the scale
of actual crimes.
It is now time to expand on these reforms by turning to victims’
interests. As United States v. Booker3 and its progeny settle into our
sentencing scheme, a paradigm shift in sentencing is at hand. Federal
judges now have considerably more leeway to make individualized
sentencing decisions and must balance the principal theories of punishment
when making these decisions. Rather than rely solely on the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, judges may now impose punishments that deviate
2
For a more detailed discussion of restitution collection rates, see infra notes 115–18
and accompanying text. The proceedings following the 2008 guilty plea agreement in the
prosecution of former Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick illustrate what can go wrong after a
court has entered a restitution order. Facing several felony charges, Kilpatrick agreed to pay
the City of Detroit $1 million in restitution. M.L. Elrick et al., Kilpatrick to City: ‘There’s
Another Day for Me,’ DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 4, 2008, 1:59 PM), http://goo.gl/XQYTKi.
In the ensuing four years, Michigan courts repeatedly stepped in to consider issues related to
the enforcement of that agreement. See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, Text Message Scandal:
Kilpatrick to Pay More on Restitution, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 2, 2012, at 4A (detailing
the order that increased Kilpatrick’s payments from $160 per month to $500 per month
toward the $859,222.80 still owed and reporting Kilpatrick’s pending appeal of the order);
Jim Schaefer et al., ‘I Lied’: Mayor Admits Guilt, Resigns from Office—Scandal that
Crippled City Ends with 2 Felony Convictions, 4 Months in Jail, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept.
5, 2008, at 1S (describing the plea agreement). When Kilpatrick was convicted of corruption
charges in March 2013, he still owed the City of Detroit $854,062.20. Tresa Baldas & Jim
Schaefer, Kilpatrick Can’t Escape Restitution: Locked Up, He’s Still on Hook for Debt to
City, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 13, 2013, at 1A.
3
543 U.S. 220 (2005).

392

DANIEL FAICHNEY

[Vol. 104

from those Guidelines, provided that their punishments comport with the
considerations set forth in the governing statutes. With the return of
judicial discretion to the sentencing field, it is not only possible but may
indeed be necessary to develop a structural approach to white-collar
sentencing that is more responsive to victims’ compensatory interests.
Without one, we may witness a slow erosion of the uniformity obtained by
two decades of binding sentencing policy: judges may increasingly use their
newly granted discretion to impose ad hoc sentences that recognize
offenders’ voluntary attempts to compensate victims in individual cases,
potentially leading to fractured and unpredictable sentencing practices.4
Formally recognizing and expanding the role of restorative measures
through the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines encourages judges to consider
victim interests in a uniform manner. This may, in turn, promote more
uniform sentencing outcomes overall.
In recent years, scholars and practitioners debated many possible
sentencing policy changes. Some, but relatively few, have made detailed
proposals for the expanded use of complementary or alternative
punishments. Indeed, since Booker, much commentary on white-collar
sentencing has focused on rethinking the measurement of economic loss5
and its role in the existing sentencing framework.6 Other authors have
addressed problems of overcriminalization,7 overpunishment or contextinsensitive punishment,8 and underpunishment.9 A smaller set of authors
4
The discretion Booker and its progeny have granted to judges has gradually eroded the
(relatively) uniform sentencing results achieved in the pre-Booker era. See infra Part I.B. A
national sentencing policy encourages uniformity. But without binding force, such a policy
must maintain judicial support if it is to have this effect over the long term.
5
See Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 721, 738–39 (2005); Peter J. Henning, White Collar Crime Sentences
After Booker: Was the Sentencing of Bernie Ebbers Too Harsh?, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV.
757, 773–78 (2006); Lana L. Freeman, Note, Sentences Should Be Reasonable, Not
Shocking: A De-emphasis on Loss for Federal Securities Fraud Sentencing, 2012 U. ILL. L.
REV. 969, 997–1002; Derick R. Vollrath, Note, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More
Just Sentencing Regime in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1012 (2010).
6
David Debold & Matthew Benjamin, Essay, “Losing Ground”—In Search of a Remedy
for the Overemphasis on Loss and Other Culpability Factors in the Sentencing Guidelines for
Fraud and Theft, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 154–55 (2011); John D. Esterhay,
Apples and Oranges: Securities Market Losses Should Be Treated Differently for Major WhiteCollar Criminal Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines, 76 MO. L. REV. 1113, 1139 (2011);
Danielle DeMasi Chattin, Note, The More You Gain, the More You Lose: Sentencing Insider
Trading Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 211–13 (2010).
7
J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment: Reflections on Michael, Martha,
and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 55–57 (2007).
8
Rodney D. Perkins, Purposes-Based Sentencing of Economic Crimes After Booker, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 521, 528–36 (2007) (arguing in favor of using the existing
sentencing statute to mitigate white-collar punishments when the Guidelines provide a
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have addressed noncarceral measures. Several of these authors have
discussed introducing to the sentencing process sanctions such as
shaming,10 criminal fines pegged to offenders’ wealth,11 asset forfeiture,12
and computer use restrictions for Internet offenders.13 Others have

flawed or unacceptable benchmark); Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar
Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 731, 756–58 (2007) [hereinafter Podgor, The
Challenge] (arguing that current white-collar sentencing law fails to adequately consider
offenders’ culpability, the unique characteristics of white-collar crime, and offenders’ future
dangerousness); Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk
Game, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 77, 87 (2010) (noting that costs and risks of white-collar trials
have created a state of affairs where plea-bargaining strategy, rather than innocence or guilt,
is the preeminent consideration in white-collar prosecution); Note, Go Directly to Jail: White
Collar Sentencing After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1732–39 (2009)
(arguing that the current sentencing model underdeters white-collar crime, overpunishes
small-scale offenders, and leads to uneven outcomes).
9
Daniel A. Chatham, Playing with Post-Booker Fire: The Dangers of Increased Judicial
Discretion in Federal White Collar Sentencing, 32 J. CORP. L. 619, 637–39 (2007); John D.
Esterhay, Note “Street Justice” for Corporate Fraud—Mandatory Minimums for Major
White-Collar Crime, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 135, 165–89 (2009); Casey C. Kannenberg,
Note, From Booker to Gall: The Evolution of the Reasonableness Doctrine as Applied to
White-Collar Criminals and Sentencing Variances, 34 J. CORP. L. 349, 378–79 (2008).
10
Bibas, supra note 5, at 739–40; Mirela V. Hristova, The Case for Insider-Trading
Criminalization and Sentencing Reform, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 267, 304–08 (2012).
11
Max Schanzenbach & Michael L. Yaeger, Prison Time, Fines, and Federal WhiteCollar Criminals: The Anatomy of a Racial Disparity, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757,
792 (2006) (“There are a couple of important policy implications to be drawn from the
analysis. First, if fines are more heavily relied upon, the analysis suggests that racial
disparities in prison sentences, particularly those between black[s] and whites, might
increase. Second, if racial disparities in white-collar sentences and fines are driven partly by
income levels and unobserved assets, then a more creative system of fining and ascertaining
the ability of offenders to pay fines might actually reduce observed racial disparities. If fines
are made proportionate to wealth and a system of payment options is created, prison time
may be forgiven in a more equitable fashion.”).
12
Heather J. Garretson, Federal Criminal Forfeiture: A Royal Pain in the Assets, 18 S.
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 45, 49 (2008) (explaining the statutory basis for criminal
forfeiture in white-collar cases); Catherine E. McCaw, Asset Forfeiture as a Form of
Punishment: A Case for Integrating Asset Forfeiture into Criminal Sentencing, 38 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 181, 197–203 (2011) (arguing that asset forfeiture may serve the same deterrence
and retribution aims effectuated by incarceration and should be considered as a viable
alternative or complementary punishment); Lisa H. Nicholson, The Culture of Underenforcement: Buried Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL BUS. &
COM. L.J. 321, 327 (2007) (arguing that, in securities fraud cases, “any funds obtained
(including any profits gained or losses avoided), as well as any assets traceable thereto,
should be forfeited. . . . [And these forfeited losses should be] returned to the corporation, or
to victimized investors”).
13
Katharine A. Alexander, Comment, Bullseye on the Nation’s Back: Combating the
Heightened Threat of Pedestrian Economic Criminals, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 559,
591–94 (2011) (recommending that courts expand the application of computer use
restrictions to punish white-collar crimes committed online).
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addressed, and recommended, the use of “restorative justice” to supplement
existing white-collar punishment.14 The role of restitution, meanwhile,
appears to have only entered the literature in passing or as a subsidiary
component of proposed reforms.15
Among these authors, Professor Stephanos Bibas describes one
alternative approach to sentencing after Booker. Professor Bibas argues
that combining “short but certain terms of imprisonment” with the use of
restitution and other noncarceral sanctions will permit the USSC to “foster
deterrence, inflict retribution, express condemnation, and heal victims at a
fraction of the cost,” thus “calibrat[ing] white-collar sentences to their core
purpose.”16 This Comment does not question the soundness of current
Guidelines-range sentences. Instead, this Comment urges courts and the
USSC to continue the white-collar sentencing “calibration” process by
establishing formal measures to more fully recognize the voluntary, presentencing payment of victim restitution by offenders—a reform that
imposes fewer costs or administrative burdens than most other proposed
complementary sanctions.
By using voluntary restitution for “autocorrection” as a “carrot” to
balance the “stick” of incarceration, courts can encourage offenders to
directly and promptly repay victims. If voluntary restitution emerges from
14
See, e.g., Zvi D. Gabbay, Exploring the Limits of the Restorative Justice Paradigm:
Restorative Justice and White-Collar Crime, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 421, 423
(2007) (arguing that “restorative justice interventions are warranted and possible even in
high-profile white-collar crime cases where restorative justice has not been applied to date”
and suggesting that a model “inspired by the South African Truth and Reconciliation
[Commission]” might be used in place of “conventional restorative justice process models
such as victim-offender mediation, group conferencing and circles” in cases of high-profile
financial crime (citation omitted)); see also id. at 451 (suggesting that “introducing
restorative justice to high-profile white-collar crime must be coupled with the current
traditional responses,” since “only through such a structure can the use of restorative
interventions be justified from both a retributive and a utilitarian perspective”).
15
See Bibas, supra note 5, at 739–40.
16
Id. at 739. “The combination of [apology, restitution, and public shaming] might
foster deterrence, inflict retribution, express condemnation, and heal victims at a fraction of
the cost.” Id. at 740. “It would condemn and deter crime ex ante without sacrificing ex post
individualized justice.” Id. For purposes of this Comment, the core aims of sentencing are
those set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012). Those aims include:
 deterrence, § 3553 (a)(2)(B);
 incapacitation, § 3553(a)(2)(C);
 rehabilitation, § 3553(a)(2)(D); and
 just punishment, § 3553(a)(2)(A).
The parsimony provision of § 3553(a) enjoins courts to impose a sentence that is “sufficient,
but not greater than necessary” to comply with the goals set forth in § 3553(a)(2) and directs
courts to consider a series of factors when crafting a sentence; § 3553(a)(7) identifies “the
need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense” as one such factor.
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the shadows of the sentencing process in a form that can be reliably
recognized and applied, more offenders might be persuaded to cooperate.
Such an incentive would reduce the destructive impact of financial crime,
which judges must already consider when sentencing white-collar
offenders.
Restitutive principles need not (and should not) be the only principles
animating criminal punishment.17 Nonetheless, they advance substantial
public interests and should play a wider, more explicit role in the sentencing
process. Toward that end, this Comment argues in favor of expanding the
role of voluntary restitution as a complementary measure that judges may
use to modestly mitigate existing Guidelines-range sentences. Operating in
this way, voluntary restitution does not compromise existing punishments.
Instead, the proposed reform provides judges and offenders with a device
that leads to better calibrated sentencing outcomes.
Resultantly, this Comment discusses the unique contribution that
voluntary restitution can make to the white-collar sentencing process and
sets forth a comprehensive proposal for encouraging it through the postBooker federal sentencing process. Part I summarizes the development and
current state of white-collar sentencing law, Part II discusses the advantages
and drawbacks of accounting for voluntary restitution in sentencing, and
Part III sets forth a proposed reform.

17

Advocates of “restitutive justice” argue that restitution should entirely replace the
current system of penal sanctions. See Randy E. Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution,
Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 157, 160 (1996)
(arguing that “(1) injustice arises when one person violates the rights of another; (2) justice
requires the rectification of this rights violation; and (3) rectification should consist of
forcing the offender to raise the victim up—restitution—rather than lowering the criminal to
the level of his victim—punishment”); Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of
Criminal Justice, 87 ETHICS 279 (1977). Restitutive justice, however, does not address the
extent to which crimes represent offenses against the public, the corresponding public
interest in expressive and retributive sanctions, or the role of these sanctions in deterring
future bad acts. For a critique of penal restitution that addresses these and other points, see
Richard C. Boldt, Restitution, Criminal Law, and the Ideology of Individuality, 77 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 977 (1986) (“[T]heories of restitution . . . fail to account for the
complementary relationship which exists between the adjudicatory and sanctioning phases of
the criminal process. In addition, they do not comprehend the larger institutional role which
each plays in creating social cohesion.”).
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF CURRENT WHITE-COLLAR SENTENCING POLICY
A. REFORMS BEFORE UNITED STATES V. BOOKER

Starting in 2001, a spate of corporate scandals thrust white-collar
crime into the spotlight. Enron came first,18 followed in turn by
WorldCom,19 Tyco,20 and Adelphia.21 Commentators responded with
outrage, and a majority of the public supported far-reaching reforms.22
Congress took notice, and passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in
July 2002.23 SOX included components intended to effectuate corporate
governance and accounting reform24 as well as provisions that addressed
white-collar sentencing.25 The former provided tools to deter or otherwise
prevent future frauds, while the latter directed the USSC to impose stiffer
punishments for white-collar crimes, especially highly egregious ones, such
as frauds that threaten the financial solvency of more than fifty

18
In November 2001, months after Enron’s financial health took a turn for the worse, the
Securities and Exchange Commission commenced an investigation into the company. See
Alex Berenson, S.E.C. Opens Investigation into Enron: A Company Fails to Explain
Dealings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at C4. One month later on December 2, 2001, the
company filed for bankruptcy. Riva D. Atlas, The Process: Path to Settling the Claims Will
Be a Long One, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at A16.
19
Following the announcement that the Securities and Exchange Commission charged
WorldCom with fraud, the company filed for bankruptcy in July 2002. Simon Romero &
Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case: $107 Billion Collapse
Isn’t Likely to Disrupt Service, for Now, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at A1. In 2004, federal
prosecutors filed criminal charges against the company’s former chief executive officer,
Bernard Ebbers, leading to a conviction in March 2005. See United States v. Ebbers, 458
F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2006).
20
Top Tyco managers and officers were indicted in September 2002. See Andrew Ross
Sorkin, 2 Top Tyco Executives Charged with $600 Million Fraud Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
13, 2002, at A1.
21
In September 2002, only days after the Tyco indictments, federal prosecutors filed
charges against Adelphia’s founder, his two sons, and former managers, alleging a
conspiracy to hide $2.5 billion in misappropriated funds. Geraldine Fabrikant, Indictments
for Founder of Adelphia and Two Sons, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at C1.
22
Rage against the executives ran so high in some quarters that one writer compared
WorldCom’s Bernard Ebbers to Osama bin Laden. Daniel Gross, Bernie bin Laden, SLATE
(Sept. 10, 2002, 6:50 PM), http://goo.gl/UBI4v1. Meanwhile, one poll found that 56% of
Americans supported either a “complete overhaul” or “major reforms” of corporate auditing
practices, and another reported that the percentage of respondents who thought that there was
“too little” regulation of big business nearly doubled between 2001 and 2002. Big Business,
GALLUP, http://goo.gl/jYxmnY (last visited Apr. 19, 2014); David W. Moore, Public: Major
Auditing Reforms Needed, GALLUP (Feb. 26, 2002), http://goo.gl/CJhN4W.
23
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
24
Id. §§ 101–501 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
25
Id. §§ 801–1107 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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individuals.26 Title IX,27 the White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act
of 2002 (WCCPA) contains pieces of both. It set harsher penalties for some
existing offenses,28 created new offenses (including destruction of corporate
audit records and certifying noncompliant financial reports), and suggested
enhancements to the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the USSC.29
While the WCCPA arrived too late to play a role in convicting and
sentencing the Enron principals, it changed corporate governance and its
regulation30 as well as revamped the punishments that apply to those who
violate these rules.31 It was, in other words, something along the lines of
what the public sought:32 a legislative effort intended to shift the norms
involving white-collar misconduct.33
On the punitive side, the tasks of defining and revising punishments
and determining the standards on which they rested fell to the USSC. The
USSC responded to SOX by establishing longer sentences for white-collar
crimes that either impacted large numbers of people or were committed by
managers.34 This action comported with a trend that dated to the inception
26
See, e.g., JOHN R. STEER, THE SENTENCING COMMISSION’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 10–12 (2003), available at http://goo.gl/L1qShH.
27
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 901.
28
These penalties included “quadrupling the maximum penalty for mail and wire fraud
(from five to 20 years’ imprisonment), and equating the maximum penalties for fraud
attempts and conspiracies with the penalties for the underlying substantive offense.” STEER,
supra note 26, at 9.
29
Id. at 15 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1350, and 1520 (2012)).
30
See Douglas M. Branson, Too Many Bells? Too Many Whistles? Corporate
Governance in the Post-Enron, Post-WorldCom Era, 58 S.C. L. REV. 65, 82–108 (2006).
31
See STEER, supra note 26, at 9.
32
For a discussion of public sentiment around this time, see supra note 22.
33
Former President George W. Bush, who signed SOX into law, called its provisions the
“most far reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt.” The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://goo.gl/2xSkEF (last visited Apr. 19, 2014). The extent to which SOX has actually
succeeded is an open question. The WCCPA steeply increased penalties for some whitecollar offenses, but one critic argues that it failed to provide an effective mechanism for
differentiating between the more serious crimes and the less serious ones. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 8, at 1730. As a result, the critic says, it “underdeters massive fraud, [and]
simultaneously overdeters the much more common minor white collar crimes.” Id.
34
Notably, the USSC:

(1) added a new sentencing enhancement category for offenders whose crime(s) impose an economic
loss on more than 250 people, so that offenders in this category face an “almost double[d]” sentence as
compared with those whose crime(s) impacted fewer than 250 people;
(2) provided a set of factors intended to help courts measure the scope of harm in large-scale cases; and
(3) added an additional enhancement of up to 50% of the Guideline-range sentence applicable in
securities fraud cases where the offender is a “corporate officer or director at the time of the offense.”

STEER, supra note 26, at 10–13.
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of the USSC and indeed was understood to be a major part of the USSC’s
mandate: stiffening white-collar sentences and eliminating the disparity
between such sentences and those imposed for other crimes.35 Before SOX,
the USSC repeatedly acted on this mandate, sometimes in concert with
Congress. In prior years, for instance, the USSC responded to legislative
mandates to increase penalties for “(1) frauds against the elderly, (2)
international currency counterfeiting, (3) computer crimes, (4) electronic
copyright infringement, (5) telemarketing fraud, (6) cellular telephone
cloning, (7) identity theft, and (8) higher education financial assistance
fraud.”36 The USSC also reformed white-collar sentencing on its own
initiative by adjusting the Guidelines’ monetary loss table37 and by
engaging in a six-year review of its economic crime provisions, which
culminated in releasing new guidelines.38
Although the shifts in white-collar sentencing policy did not generate
penalty increases as dramatic as those seen in sentencing for some other
types of crimes,39 the trend toward imposing harsher penalties for economic

35

See id. at 1 (“Th[e] first group of commissioners also carefully studied the
Commission’s organic statute and its legislative history. They found therein strong
indications that Congress wanted the Commission to toughen the sentences for fraud,
embezzlement, and other economic crimes. The Commission did just that, reducing
substantially the general availability of probation sentences, and increasing the likelihood
that ‘white-collar’[ ]criminals would have to spend some time in jail . . . .”); see also United
States v. Davis, 537 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2008) (“One of the central reasons for creating
the sentencing guidelines was to ensure stiffer penalties for white-collar crimes and to
eliminate disparities between white-collar sentences and sentences for other crimes.”).
36
STEER, supra note 26, at 3.
37
The loss table is a fixture of the Guidelines’ white-collar provisions that provides for
sentencing enhancements corresponding with the magnitude of monetary losses caused by
the crime. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2012), available at
http://goo.gl/aJwHeh. Past editions of the Sentencing Guidelines are also available. See
Guidelines Manual Archives, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, http://goo.gl/UiUrkS (last visited
Apr. 19, 2014).
38
STEER, supra note 26, at 3–9; see Frank O. Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic
Crime Sentencing Reforms: An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5, 32–37
(2001) (describing the procedural history of the 2001 economic crime package). The
revisions modified the then-existing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2B1.1 (theft guidelines)
and § 2F1.1 (fraud guidelines), and consolidated them within a single section, § 2B1.1. Id. at
7 n.1. As Judge Diana Murphy, chair of the USSC in 2001, explained in a contemporary
article, the 2001 economic crime amendment package “simplif[ied the] Guidelines
application for economic crimes, significantly increase[d] penalties for offenses involving
high dollar losses, and provide[d] more discretion to judges in sentencing defendants who
caused or intended relatively low losses.” Diana E. Murphy, Inside the United States
Sentencing Commission: Federal Sentencing Policy in 2001 and Beyond, 87 IOWA L. REV.
359, 363–64 (2002).
39
See Andrew Weissmann & Joshua A. Block, White-Collar Defendants and WhiteCollar Crimes, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 286, 287 (2007) (noting that the average fraud
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crimes did broadly track with a systemic shift in the criminal law over the
last three decades. The Sentencing Reform Act of 198440 (which created
the USSC and made its sentencing guidelines binding on judges) set forth a
host of punishment theories and considerations intended to guide sentencing
decisions.41 Nonetheless, much legislation since that time has focused on
“deterrence,” “incapacitation,” and the goal of “communicat[ing] with the
offender about her wrongdoing,”42 all of which find their primary
expression in incarceration.43
The USSC’s SOX implementation process was consistent with
systemic shifts in sentencing in general and white-collar sentencing in
particular, but it was also one of the USSC’s final major acts before the
judicially binding sentencing guidelines succumbed to a constitutional
challenge. In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v.

sentence increased by 5.3 months between 1995 and 2005, while the average sentence for
national security crimes increased sixfold, to 126.7 months).
40
Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211–39, 98 Stat. 1987, 1987–2040 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.).
41
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), (7) (2012) (including such aims as rehabilitation and
victim compensation).
42
Laura I. Appleman, Retributive Justice and Hidden Sentencing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307,
1327–28 (2007). Shifts in drug-related sentencing since 1980 illustrate this trend most
clearly. Between 1980 and 2003, the number of prisoners serving time for drug-related
offenses increased twelvefold. MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25YEAR QUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 9 (2007),
available at http://goo.gl/wafjES. Meanwhile, between 1991 and 2004, inmate participation
in drug treatment programs fell by more than half. Id. at 15.
43
This development is consistent with Professor William Stuntz’s theory of the political
dynamics of criminal law, which posits that the incentives governing criminal legislation and
enforcement tend to turn the criminal law into a “one-way ratchet,” turning steadily toward
broader proscription and higher penalties; ratchet-turning minimizes prosecutors’ overall
costs of obtaining convictions and manages the risk of public backlash against legislators.
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519–
20, 546–57 (2001). “Most criminal laws are written reactively[—]an event happens, and
Congress provides legislation to appease the public.” Podgor, The Challenge, supra note 8,
at 743. Large majorities of the general public have favored increased incarceration at points
during the past twenty years: During the 1988–91 sampling period, nearly 84% of General
Social Survey respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition that
“[p]eople who break the law should be given stiffer sentences.” NAT’L OP. RESEARCH CTR.,
GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS, 1972–2012: CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK 2363 (2013), available at
http://goo.gl/Au3wBr.
Some new evidence shows that public appetites for more
incarceration may now be waning. See, e.g., PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PUBLIC OPINION ON
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS POLICY IN AMERICA 2–5 (2012), available at
http://goo.gl/r0wr9m (reporting the results of a 2010 survey showing that 45% of
respondents believe the American prison population is too large and showing that large
majorities of respondents support reducing prison sentences for nonviolent offenders and
favor prioritizing recidivism reduction over time served).
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Booker.44 In Booker, the Court abrogated the portion of the Sentencing
Reform Act45 that made the Guidelines mandatory.46 Booker did not write
the Guidelines out of existence; rather, it ordered judges to “consult” the
Guidelines when calculating an appropriate sentence.47 Decisions rendered
under this new framework would then be subject to appellate review for
reasonableness.48
B. DISCRETION RETURNS AFTER BOOKER

In the wake of Booker, the Supreme Court carved out a new role for
the Guidelines. In Rita v. United States, the Court clarified the standard of
appellate review governing sentencing decisions and held that Guidelinesrange sentences are presumptively reasonable.49
Early in the following term, the Court held in Gall v. United States that
a below-Guidelines, noncustodial sentence for a former drug dealer was
“reasonable” because it reflected the sentencing judge’s considered,
individualized assessment of the facts relevant to sentencing.50 As the
Court explained, the district judge carefully evaluated the offender’s
conduct, finding evidence of rehabilitation in both the offender’s preindictment decision to abandon his drug-dealing enterprise and his
cooperation with authorities after indictment.51 Compelled by this
rehabilitation evidence, the district judge departed from the Guidelines and
ordered the offender to serve a term of probation.52 The Supreme Court
upheld the decision over the Eighth Circuit’s objection, noting that Booker
made strict adherence to the Guidelines’ sentencing formula inappropriate.
The Court explained that circuit courts “must give due deference to the

44

543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Id. at 259 (abrogating 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV)).
46
The binding guidelines did, however, survive an early constitutional challenge. See
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
47
Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.
48
Id. at 261.
49
See 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (holding that (1) sentencing judges must consult the
Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; (2) any sentence that falls within the
Guidelines range is presumed reasonable for purposes of appellate review; and (3) the
“reasonableness” standard governing such review is equivalent to abuse of discretion).
50
552 U.S. 38, 53–57 (2007).
51
Id. at 43–45.
52
Specifically, the district court judge reasoned that “[a]ny term of imprisonment in this
case would be countereffective by depriving society of the contributions of the Defendant
who, the Court has found, understands the consequences of his criminal conduct and is doing
everything in his power to forge a new life. The Defendant’s post-offense conduct indicates
neither that he will return to criminal behavior nor that the Defendant is a danger to society.”
United States v. Gall, 374 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763 (S.D. Iowa 2005).
45
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district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justify the
extent of the variance.”53 Determining whether a variance is justified is
necessarily an individualized process: “It has been uniform and constant in
the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every
convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the
human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and
the punishment to ensue.”54
The Court next articulated a deferential approach to judicial policy
decisions in sentencing. In Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme
Court’s third post-Booker sentencing case, the Court upheld a belowGuidelines sentence for a crack dealer.55 In that case, the district judge
disagreed with the crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity and adjusted
the offender’s sentence accordingly.56 The Supreme Court upheld that
sentence, noting that the district judge’s assessment of narcotics sentencing
policy was a valid consideration in determining a “sufficient, but not greater
than necessary” sentence under § 3553(a).57
The upshot of Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough is that judges once again
have considerable discretion to make individualized determinations based
on all of the major sentencing rationales when choosing the appropriate
sentence to impose. The statute governing the requisite initial phase of
judicial penal analysis, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), sets forth the principal
sentencing goals and permits judges to consider nearly all of the leading
theories of punishment and related considerations, including retribution58

53

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors set forth policy rationales that
judges must consult, per Booker, when making a sentencing decision.
54
Id. at 52 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
55
552 U.S. 85, 91–93 (2007).
56
Id. at 92–93.
57
Id. at 110–11 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Lower courts have since read Kimbrough to extend beyond the realm of drug sentencing.
See United States v. Johnson, 588 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1002–05 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (departing
downward from the Guidelines range in a child pornography case in which the applicable
Guidelines did not permit judges to distinguish between the “most and the least egregious”
offenders and, consequently, did not support individualized application of the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553 factors). Policy-based deviations were not always reversed even before Kimbrough.
See United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming, preKimbrough, the trial court’s below-Guidelines sentence for child pornography possession
premised on disagreement with the Guidelines’ treatment of sentence-mitigating factors).
58
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012) (explaining that sentences should be designed
“to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense”).
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(or “just deserts”59), incapacitation,60 general deterrence,61 rehabilitation,62
uniformity,63 and victim remediation.64 As long as the judge’s sentencing
decision is not egregious65 and comports with the utilitarian injunction that
sentences be “sufficient, but no greater than necessary” to comply with the
§ 3553(a) factors, that decision should survive appellate review. Empirical
data illustrates the effects of this change: the Guidelines continue to set
basic sentencing norms, but individualized assessment and policy analysis
have measurably altered aggregate sentencing outcomes.66
59

See William W. Berry III, Mitigation in Federal Sentencing in the United States, in
MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 247, 253–54 (Julian V. Roberts ed., 2011).
60
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (explaining that sentences should be designed “to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”).
61
See id. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (explaining that sentences should be designed “to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”).
62
See id. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (explaining that sentences should be designed “to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner”).
63
See id. § 3553(a)(6) (explaining “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”).
64
See id. § 3553(a)(7) (explaining “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense”).
65
What constitutes egregiousness (that is, an abuse of discretion) in the white-collar
context is still being worked out in the circuit courts. See John H. Chun & Gregory M.
Gilchrist, Challenges for White Collar Sentencing in the Post-Booker Era, CHAMPION,
May/June 2008, at 36.
66
Reports from the district courts shed some light on changes currently afoot. A
national study on interjudge sentencing variation found statistically significant variations in
approximately 60% of courthouses. Susan B. Long & David Burnham, TRAC Report:
Examining Current Federal Sentencing Practices: A National Study of Differences Among
Judges, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 6, 15 (2012). The Long and Burnham study did not consider
the extent to which sentences conformed to the Guidelines, but rather considered only
interjudge variation within courthouses and between districts in 370,000 criminal cases
completed between 2007 and 2011. Id. It found, among other things, that the median whitecollar sentence spanned a 39-month range between the lowest sentencing judge and the
highest sentencing judge in the Northern District of Illinois (making it the widest varying
district in the nation), a 23.5-month range in Atlanta (fourth-widest varying), a 22.5-month
range in Manhattan (sixth-widest varying), and a 19.5-month range in Kansas City (tenthwidest varying). Id.; see also Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity after
Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2010) (noting that, among Boston judges
in the District of Massachusetts, “the effect of the judge on sentence length is now twice as
strong as in the three years before Booker”). Nonetheless, the Guidelines still form the
bedrock of federal sentencing, especially in some districts. In 2003, the ten districts that
complied least with the Guidelines still complied between 41% (District of Arizona) and
64.7% (District of New Jersey) of the time, while the ten most compliant districts in that year
issued Guidelines-range sentences between 88.9% (Western District of Oklahoma) and
82.1% (District of Utah) of the time. Frank O. Bowman, III, Nothing Is Not Enough: Fix the
Absurd Post-Booker Federal Sentencing System, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 356, 362 fig.4A
(2012). In 2011, the comparable ranges were 24.6% (Eastern District of Wisconsin) to
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C. WHITE-COLLAR SENTENCING MITIGATION AFTER BOOKER

In the white-collar context, judges have used their post-Booker
discretion to make significant “downward departures”67 from Guidelinesrange sentences. Many of these non-Guidelines sentences have been
vacated on appeal.68 Circuit courts, in deciding to vacate, have either
explicitly or implicitly expressed misgivings about treating white-collar
offenders too leniently, as had occurred in the pre-Guidelines era.69 Courts
have also specifically noted their intentions to avoid creating the perception
that white-collar offenders can “buy their way” out of a prison sentence.70
34.9% (Southern District of New York) at the low end, and 80.4% (Southern District of
Mississippi) to 70.6% (Middle District of North Carolina) at the high end. Id. at 362 fig.4B;
see also Berry, supra note 59, at 258 (“Despite the broader discretion offered and even
required of judges under Booker and section 3553, judges have adopted the guideline
sentence in an overwhelming majority of cases.”).
67
See, e.g., United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 745, 754–55 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(imposing a sixty-month sentence on fraud offenders despite a Guidelines range of 360
months to life, and explaining why the Guidelines did not yield a sentence that comported
with § 3553(a)). After Booker, the term “departure” no longer has the same significance.
See United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that “instead of
employing the pre-Booker terminology of departures, we have moved toward characterizing
sentences as either fitting within the advisory guidelines range or not”). Nevertheless, given
that the Guidelines remain the starting point of the federal sentencing calculus, Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), and an appellate court may (though need not) presume
that a within-Guidelines sentence is “reasonable” for the purposes of appellate review, id.,
the term “downward departure” remains a useful shorthand for sentences that deviate from
the Guidelines norms.
68
See, e.g., United States v. Peppel, 707 F.3d 627, 631 (6th Cir. 2013) (vacating a sevenday sentence where the offender’s Guidelines calculation called for 97–121 months); United
States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1287–89; 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2006) (vacating sentence of
restitution and five hours’ confinement where the fraud offender’s Guidelines calculation
was twenty-four to thirty months and the offender was unlikely to satisfy the restitution
judgment upon which the district judge justified the departure); see also Matthew A. Ford,
Note, White-Collar Crime, Social Harm, and Punishment: A Critique and Modification of
the Sixth Circuit’s Ruling in United States v. Davis, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 383, 385 n.11
(2008) (listing cases where sentences were vacated on appeal).
69
“[I]n enacting § 3553, Congress was especially concerned that prior to the Sentencing
Guidelines, [m]ajor white collar criminals often [were] sentenced to small fines and little or
no imprisonment.” United States v. Livesay, 587 F.3d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1291
(11th Cir. 2006) (noting, in a case where an offender’s fraud caused a loss of over $480,000
to a small family-owned bank and the district court imposed a probation-only sentence, that
the USSC deliberately linked financial loss to sentencing severity to reflect the offense’s
seriousness, and holding that the lenient punishment did not comport with this goal); cf.
United States v. DeMonte, 25 F.3d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the Guidelines
sought to eradicate the disparities between punishments for “street crime” and punishments
for white-collar crime).
70
See, e.g., United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 505 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Allowing
sentencing courts to depart downward based on a defendant’s ability to make restitution
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Despite these considerations, circuit courts have not vacated all
significantly downward-departing white-collar sentences.71 In evaluating
the sentences that have survived appellate review both before and after
Booker, several themes emerge. Some courts have recognized defendants’
public, expressive good works involving “hands-on, personal sacrifice,”72
and charitable acts requiring considerable personal involvement.73 Several
others have emphasized utilitarian considerations, upholding downwarddeparting sentences in those situations where the adverse collateral
consequences of incarceration (e.g., failure of a business, harm to innocent
employees or family members, and assorted personal impacts) outweigh the
benefits achieved by long sentences.74 Finally, in a few cases, courts have
departed downward where defendants made especially arduous efforts to

would thwart the intent of the guidelines to punish financial crimes through terms of
imprisonment by allowing those who could pay to escape prison. It would also create an
unconstitutional system where the rich could in effect buy their way out of prison
sentences.” (quoting United States v. Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380, 1389 (7th Cir. 1994))).
71
See Chun & Gilchrist, supra note 65, at 39.
72
Id. (quoting United States v. Cooper, 394 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2005)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
73
See, e.g., Cooper, 394 F.3d at 177. In Cooper, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld a downward departure in a pre-Booker case where the offender “mentored [an]
underprivileged young man, who later attributed his success to [the offender].” Id. “[The
offender] also paid for not one, but four young men to attend a high school together where
they would have a better opportunity to succeed.” Id. These kinds of extraordinary efforts
justified the departure. Id.
74
See, e.g., United States v. Spero, 382 F.3d 803, 804–05 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming a
sentence of home confinement and probation where the offender demonstrated that
incarceration would deprive his developmentally disabled son of necessary parental support);
see also Chun & Gilchrist, supra note 65, at 39.
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pay restitution,75 or paid restitution beyond the amount required by the
Guidelines or the governing law.76
II. VOLUNTARY RESTITUTION: CAN OFFENDERS AUTOCORRECT, AND
SHOULD THEY?
A. VOLUNTARY RESTITUTION COMPENSATES VICTIMS AND REDUCES
CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS

Among the mitigating factors discussed in the preceding Part,
voluntary restitution is unique. Because voluntary restitution is an
affirmative act, intended to return ill-gotten gains directly to victims, it is
unlike and, from a utilitarian standpoint, superior to the indirect purgation
that may occur when an offender performs charitable works.77 In contrast
75

United States v. Kim, 364 F.3d 1235, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging that
offenders took out loans and depleted their life savings to make restitution). Compare
United States v. Filipiak, 466 F.3d 582, 583–84 (7th Cir. 2006) (declining to grant an
offender, a former director of accounting and administration, an additional reduction to a
below-Guidelines range sentence where the offender returned the balance of documented
losses but “still had a net worth of $1.4 million at the time of sentencing, and . . . may have
been able to make restitution precisely because she profited from investing the very funds
she pilfered from her employer”), with United States v. Oligmueller, 198 F.3d 669, 672 (8th
Cir. 1999) (upholding a downward departure based on the fact that the offender, a cattle
rancher who defrauded a bank by misrepresenting the amount of livestock he possessed (1)
“voluntarily began making restitution almost a year before he was indicted,” (2) “worked
hard to ensure that his assets received the highest possible value, including taking care of the
crops until harvest, carefully tending the livestock until sale, and loading the hay trucks for
the bank,” (3) “often worked sixteen-hour days,” (4) “turned over his life insurance policy
and his wife’s certificate of deposit,” (5) “took an outside job,” (6) “gave up his home,” and
(7) paid back “nearly ninety-four percent” of what he owed).
76
See, e.g., Kim, 364 F.3d at 1244–45 (noting that defendants’ restitution amounted to
140% of offenders’ share of losses incurred); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7) (2012)
(establishing that the need to pay restitution to victims is a relevant factor in the sentencing
calculus). Section 3553(a)(7) also has a utilitarian dimension in that a harsh sentence may
undercut the offender’s ability to work in order to repay her victims. See, e.g., United States
v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 803–04 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that “the district court’s goal of
obtaining restitution for the victims of Defendant’s offense, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7), is better
served by a non-incarcerated and employed defendant” (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)). English sentencing law includes a similar consideration: “the making of
reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences.” Andrew Ashworth, Reevaluating the Justifications for Aggravation and Mitigation at Sentencing, in MITIGATION
AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING, supra note 59, at 21, 24.
77
This is not to say that charitable works could not directly aid victims or aid individuals
similarly situated to victims, but rather that the type of charitable works commonly invoked
by individuals pursuing mitigation are often within the range of normal behavior for
professional people and have no direct connection to the harm done. See, e.g., United States
v. Morken, 133 F.3d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that “advis[ing] local business
owners, hir[ing] young people, serv[ing] on [a] church council, and rais[ing] money for
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with generalized community volunteer service or donations to third parties,
restitution directly repairs the harm that the offender has done. Moreover,
by drawing upon or, in extraordinary cases, exhausting the offender’s
financial resources to compensate victims,78 it ensures that the offender
bears at least some of the cost of the harm done. In some cases, this result
may be superior to punishment that forces the state to bear the full cost of
harm through incarceration.79 One reason such a result may be superior in
the white-collar context is that white-collar offenders are especially
susceptible to specific deterrence, at least in the aggregate. Although it has
been argued that white-collar convictions are difficult to obtain,80 and may
not represent the full extent of an offender’s bad acts,81 first-time fraud
offenders are least likely among all individuals convicted of federal crimes
to recidivate.82 In the ideal case, such as where the offender offers
restitution in sufficient quantities to compensate the victim or victims for
the full extent of their economic losses, and does so promptly, the offender
becomes a partner in achieving what might be the closest possible
approximation of an optimal response to a crime.83 With victim interests at
charity” are activities that are “neither exceptional nor out of the ordinary” for a prominent
citizen and cannot justify a downward departure).
78
See, e.g., Kim, 364 F.3d at 1244–45 (finding, pre-Booker, that the offender’s payment
exceeded total profits from his crime and was made at great personal cost, warranting a
downward departure).
79
In 2009, the average annual per-inmate incarceration cost within the federal prison
system was $25,251. Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 76 Fed. Reg.
6,161 (Feb. 3, 2011).
80
Weissmann & Block, supra note 39, at 290 n.18 (“White-collar prosecutions are
notoriously difficult to pursue successfully because they depend on complex financial
records and often arcane regulatory schemes, and white-collar defendants are often
represented by skilled and well-financed attorneys.”).
81
Id. (noting that the nature of white-collar crime and the difficulty of obtaining a
conviction in this context makes it more likely that “a ‘first time’ white-collar offender may
have engaged in prior frauds without being detected, charged, and convicted”).
82
The recidivism rate for first-time fraud offenders is 9.3%, less than half the rate among
all offenders (22.1%), and the lowest among all crimes covered by the Guidelines. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF
THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 20 ex.1, 30 ex.11 (2004), available at
http://goo.gl/9xRgGV.
83
“The Pareto theory of equilibrium holds that an optimum is a state in which no person
can benefit without a corresponding detriment to another person.” Donald V. MacDougall,
The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives—Remedies for Constitutional Violations in
Canada and the United States, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 608, 636 n.181 (1985). The
general analogy to Pareto optimality here is intended to be illustrative. Assuming that
victims of white-collar crime would prefer to be compensated promptly and fully, rather than
see a maximally long sentence imposed on the offender, and assuming further that those two
outcomes might sometimes be mutually incompatible, making use of a rule that encourages
voluntary restitution leaves victims better off by increasing the likelihood that offenders will
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least partly addressed, judges remain free to impose a sentence that best
advances the remaining penal policies.
B. ADDRESSING THE “BUYOUT” AND REDUNDANCY PROBLEMS

Despite its positive qualities, voluntary restitution remains a
“discouraged” factor in the Guidelines’ sentencing mitigation calculus.84 In
part, this is due to the architecture of the Guidelines themselves. During the
initial Guidelines determination, sentencing judges must consider any
relevant USSC policy statements.85 Under the policy statement governing
departures (§ 5K2.0(d)(5)), judges may not deviate from a Guidelines
sentence calculation in cases where a defendant pays restitution at or below
the amount “required by law including the [G]uidelines . . . .”86 The
relevant law and Guidelines provide that full restitution after conviction
will usually be obligatory and may not justify a departure. Preconviction
restitution, however, may suffice to warrant a limited departure. The
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) requires that judges
order full restitution to victims of all offenses against property (including
those committed by fraud or deceit) except where assessing restitution is
“impracticable” or otherwise imposes a burden on the sentencing process
serious enough to outweigh victims’ need for restitution.87 The Guidelines,
in turn, provide for limited sentencing adjustments where offenders fulfill
their restitution obligation before conviction, and also permit additional
departures (but only in extraordinary cases88).
In considering defendants’ requests to accord greater mitigating effect
to restitution payments than the Guidelines expressly provide, courts have
repay victims. Courts and law enforcement are also better off: encouraging voluntary
restitution takes no punishment (and hence no deterrent tool) off the table, but lightens the
financial burden associated with enforcing mandatory restitution orders and adjudicating
civil suits for damages. For reasons discussed infra note 120, reducing white-collar crime by
relying on incarceration alone might be a uniquely expensive proposition. Voluntary
restitution permits the offender, rather than taxpayers, to shoulder some of the costs of the
crime, reducing the costs to society where the judge deems the repayment sufficient to
mitigate the sentence. Finally, by creating an opportunity for offenders to engage in selfinitiated remedial behavior, courts encourage offenders to accept responsibility, benefitting
society at large. The stakeholders whose punitive interests are left worse off in this equation
are those who favor retributive punishment or incapacitation over other punitive policies,
notwithstanding the associated actual or opportunity costs.
84
United States v. Kim, 364 F.3d 1235, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004).
85
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 37, at § 1B1.1(b).
86
Id. § 5K2.0(d)(5).
87
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012)).
88
For a discussion of how the Guidelines address preconviction restitution, see infra Part
III.B.
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sometimes concluded that the foregoing authorities make such mitigation
unnecessarily redundant.
Courts have also expressed concern that
additional mitigation might send the wrong message to offenders and
would-be offenders by suggesting, in effect, that money can buy a ticket out
of jail.89 Neither concern should foreclose this Comment’s proposed
reform. In addressing the significant mandatory restitution collection gap,
increased restitution-based mitigation complements existing restitutionary
sanctions and furthers the compensatory goals already established by
restitution statutes and the Guidelines. By formally encouraging victim
remediation while leaving robust carceral sanctions in place, restitutionbased mitigation avoids the “buyout” problem that sometimes arises when
defendants urge courts to waive carceral sanctions altogether. The
following Sections discuss both the “buyout” and “redundancy” concerns in
greater detail.
1. The “Buyout” Problem
When defendants make restitution and seek mitigation in excess of the
amount prescribed by the Guidelines, courts have expressed concern that
excessive mitigation might create a perception that an offender can buy her
way out of jail.90 This is a well-justified concern: unconstrained, the
substitution of cash payments for time served undermines the deterrence,
retributive, and exemplary goals set forth in § 3553(a)(2). If would-be
offenders believe that they will be able to purchase leniency by voluntarily
making restitution, they might be less likely to act lawfully in the first
place, especially if they are capable of repaying victims in the event that
they are caught.91 In turn, members of the public might notice this cost–
benefit phenomenon and lose faith in courts’ ability to impartially
administer justice.
Because courts have endeavored to dispel the perception that whitecollar offenders can simply buy their way out of prison sentences, it is
critically important to distinguish limited restitution-based mitigation from
such a “buyout” scenario. Structural context provides one important point
of distinction. Under a system of ad hoc mitigation in which offenders
might be able to fully avoid serving time for serious crimes, “buyout” (and
its consequences) will likely arise from time to time. Where, however, the
restitution-based mitigation is expressly defined, limited in scope, and

89

See, e.g., United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 505 (4th Cir. 2010).
Id.
91
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012); see also Weissmann & Block, supra note 39, at
290 (arguing that Enron-era scandals demonstrated that then-existing civil and criminal
penalties underdeterred white-collar criminals).
90

2014]

AUTOCORRECT?

409

yields the lion’s share of benefits to victims rather than offenders, “buyout”
is far less likely to occur. Two additional considerations further distinguish
such limited restitution-based mitigation from “buyout” mitigation: the
focus on victim interests required by § 3553(a)(7), and the proportional
relationship between such mitigation and existing carceral punishment.
The Ninth Circuit’s United States v. Rangel92 decision illustrates how
prioritizing victim interests can justify construing restitution as a remedial,
rather than evasive, recourse. In Rangel, the circuit court held that the
district judge did not abuse his discretion when he imposed on an offender
an above-Guidelines sentence (twenty-nine months, or about 12% above the
Guidelines maximum93) in response to the offender’s failure to mitigate $20
million in losses that he caused.94 There, the district court did not consider
“Rangel’s inability to pay restitution itself as an aggravating factor in
imposing a longer sentence, but focused instead on the impact on the
victims of Rangel’s crimes.”95 The circuit court approvingly acknowledged
this critical distinction and noted that the sentence rested on the “restitution
to the victims” factor of § 3553,96 rather than on a motive to “punish Rangel
for his inability to pay.”97 Accordingly, the court explained, the sentence
responded to “the financial ruin that Rangel caused his victims, and the
length of time it would take them to recover their losses,”98 rather than to
Rangel’s financial status.
The utilitarian focus of § 3553(a)(7)99 points to a difference between
sentence-mitigating restitution and “buyout.” While “buyout” amounts to
the avoidance of a prison term, sentence-mitigating restitution properly
considers the status of victims and should never justify wholly noncarceral
punishment unless the rest of the § 3553(a) analysis supports doing so
under truly extraordinary circumstances. A hypothetical reversed Rangel
scenario further illustrates this difference.
Under such a scenario, the offender has repaid the $20 million owed to
victims, and the court notes his repayment when consulting § 3553(a)(7) at
sentencing. Since the “restitution” factor cuts in the offender’s favor, the

92

697 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 799–800.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 804.
96
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7).
97
Rangel, 697 F.3d at 804 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98
Id.
99
This victim-driven inquiry has also informed decisions to impose custodial sentences
on independently wealthy offenders who do not need to stay employed in order to pay courtordered restitution. See, e.g., United States v. Miell, 744 F. Supp. 2d 904, 948–49, 955–56,
960 (N.D. Iowa 2010).
93
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court holds that the offender might be eligible for a reduced sentence, or at
least does not deserve an upward-departing one.100 Such an outcome would
be superior to the one obtained in the real world Rangel. The victims would
be compensated, reducing the vast consequential losses stemming from the
crimes. Since the need to pay restitution is only one of several
considerations in the § 3553 rubric, and only comes into play following the
initial Guidelines determination, the judge may (and almost certainly will)
impose a sufficient custodial sentence and any other sanctions necessary to
carry forward the other punitive goals set forth in the statute.
In his appeal, the Rangel defendant argued that the district court’s
application of § 3553(a)(7) violated settled principles of sentencing equity.
Under Williams v. Illinois and Tate v. Short, a judge may not excessively
aggravate a custodial sentence101 or impose an ad hoc custodial sentence102
based on an offender’s inability to pay a fine. Relatedly, under Bearden v.
Georgia, a judge cannot revoke an offender’s probation because the
offender has blamelessly failed to pay a fine or make restitution.103 These
decisions make clear that indigent offenders should not face incarceration
simply because they cannot, due to no fault of their own, satisfy the
conditions of a fine-only punishment.104 They do not, however, address
statutorily authorized carceral punishment that accounts for the interests of
victims of economic crimes. The Rangel court recognized this distinction,
and concluded that courts may consider the status of victims when applying
§ 3553(a)(7).105
Tate, Williams, and Bearden support the broader proposition that
“class and wealth distinctions . . . have no place in criminal sentencing.”106
100
The appropriate size of the reduction depends on other determinations the judge
makes during the sentencing process.
101
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970) (holding that a court may not
impose a longer prison term based on the defendant’s inability to pay a fine).
102
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 396–97 (1971).
103
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668–69 (1980).
104
Id. at 667–68, 672.
105
Rangel, 697 F.3d at 803–04 (“A sentencing court is empowered to consider whether
the victims will receive restitution from the defendant in varying from the Sentencing
Guidelines based on § 3553(a) factors.”).
106
Rangel, 697 F.3d at 804 (quoting United States v. Burgum, 633 F.3d 810, 816 (9th
Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The appellant in Tate served a custodial
sentence on a Houston, Texas prison farm for his inability to pay outstanding traffic fines,
despite the fact that the Houston traffic court had no authority to impose custodial sentences.
401 U.S. at 396. The appellant in Williams, convicted of petty theft, received a sentence 101
days longer than the statutory maximum pursuant to a court order that he “work off” the
balance of his unpaid fines at the rate of $5 per day. 399 U.S. at 236–37 (internal quotation
marks omitted). In Bearden, the offender received a suspended sentence, plus fines and
restitution, for burglary and “theft by receiving stolen property;” he then lost his job, and
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This manifestly valid proposition does not require courts to remain blind to
the status of the victims at sentencing, and it should not require courts to
disregard an offender’s decision to return to victims ill-gotten gains. The
initial Guidelines sentence calculation for white-collar punishment is
pegged to the extent of financial loss arising from the wrongful act.107
Acknowledging an offender’s efforts to remediate that loss and return illgotten gains need not undermine such proportional punishment, much less
implicate Tate–Williams–Bearden issues. Instead, providing an offender
with an opportunity to promptly and responsibly return illicit profit makes
use of a valuable and long-established remedial tool, and offers offenders a
final opportunity to engage in socially beneficial corrective behavior (i.e., to
“autocorrect”) before sentencing.
If restitution-based mitigation is
unavailable, the offender has a powerful incentive to spend wildly or hide
her ill-gotten gains for as long as she can.
One issue relevant to an equal protection inquiry is whether making a
restitution-based mitigation channel available specifically for white-collar
offenders would encourage a return to the pre-Sentencing Reform Act era,
when white-collar offenders tended to receive more lenient sentences than
other offenders.108 After several decades of white-collar sentencing reform,
the law governing white-collar crime has shifted considerably, making this
concern less pressing than it was twenty-five years ago.109 Guidelinesrange sentences, still the source of the predominating norms, are stiffer. In
addition, thanks to the efforts of Congress and the USSC, federal whitecollar criminal law is more sophisticated than it was before the Sentencing
Reform Act took effect. The reform outlined in the following Part
corresponds directly with the Guidelines, prescribing mitigation in
proportion to the existing sentencing framework. Carving out a wider role
for voluntary restitution in this manner might modestly reduce the overall

failed to make a timely payment on his fine and restitution. 461 U.S. at 603. The state, in
turn, imposed a carceral sentence on the offender. Id.
107 See STEER, supra note 26, at 2. Under the Guidelines, economic crimes leading to
smaller losses lead to lower initial sentencing calculations. In a hypothetical securities fraud
situation where an offender reaps no ill-gotten gains or causes minimal provable losses, the
Tate–Williams–Bearden inquiry might be different and so might the proper punishment.
108
Id. at 1 (“The group of commissioners who developed the initial sentencing
guidelines for individual defendants used a systematic approach, which included a rather
sophisticated measurement of past sentencing practices. Analyzing this research, the
Commission noted some apparent inequities. For example, generally speaking, ‘blue-collar’
theft and property destruction offenses were being sentenced more severely than ‘whitecollar’ fraud offenses that caused comparable dollar harm. Furthermore, economic crimes
generally were punished less severely than other criminal conduct that the Commission
considered to be of equivalent seriousness.”).
109
See supra Part I.A.
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length of custodial sentences served by white-collar offenders, but it need
not reduce the proportion of offenders who receive a substantial custodial
sentence pursuant to the Guidelines analysis and a careful balancing of the
remaining § 3553 factors. If implementing the reform is guided by a set of
rigorous standards, it will not function any differently than other sentencing
adjustments. To the extent that it further incorporates nonretributive
considerations into the sentencing process, it will not be much different
from alternative and complementary sentencing programs. Such programs
are not new: pretrial diversion,110 drug courts,111 and court-ordered
community service112 operate nationwide and address a wide range of
offenses. Given the long-standing operation of these alternative sentencing
programs alongside carceral punishment, the expansion of restitution-based
mitigation within the conventional sentencing process would not likely be
disruptive.
Regardless, the act of paying restitution does not negate any element
of the crime. The offender does not escape conviction, incarceration, or the
consequences (personal, professional, and otherwise) stemming therefrom.
The sentencing judge still must conduct a § 3553(a) analysis and craft a
sentence that best effectuates all of the relevant penal policies. The court
might also impose additional penalties (such as asset forfeiture and
additional mandatory restitution) if evidence indicates that the offender has
garnered, but not disgorged, additional ill-gotten gains in connection with
the offense.113 The offender making restitution accordingly would not

110

Federal pretrial diversion programs, established by the Pretrial Services Act of 1982,
Pub L. No. 97-267, 96 Stat. 1136, and governed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152–56 (2012), are available
to many defendants at the discretion of the U.S. Attorney’s Office. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, TITLE 9: CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 22.100
[hereinafter CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL], available at http://goo.gl/RPv2tW (last updated
Apr. 2011). There is some concern, however, that pretrial diversion has failed to gain traction
in the federal courts. See, e.g., Joseph M. Zlatic et al., Pretrial Diversion: The Over-Looked
Pretrial Services Evidence-Based Practice, 74 FED. PROBATION 28, 28–29 (2010).
111
In 2009, over 2,400 drug courts operated in the United States, including 30 in federal
district courts. WEST HUDDLESTON & DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST.,
PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 19 & tbl.2 (2011), available at
http://goo.gl/4lbCL7.
112
In federal court, judges may assign community service as a condition of probation.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 37, § 8B1.3.
113
Such a situation might obtain where the offender uses the proceeds of her illegal act
to make profitable investments. To avoid unjust enrichment or to ensure adequate specific
deterrence and retribution, the court in these situations could impose complementary
punishments, such as asset forfeiture. For a discussion of situations where restitution might
be insufficient and an explanation of how asset forfeiture might complement it, see
Nicholson, supra note 12, at 370–77.
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escape punishment, but rather would receive punishment tailored to both
the offense and the balance of unmitigated harm, if any, that remains.
2. The Redundancy Problem
On its face, the widespread use of mandatory restitution in sentencing
calls into question the value and relevancy of any voluntary restitution
scheme. Mandatory restitution is a well-established component of whitecollar criminal punishment114 and may achieve some of the same
compensatory goals. This invites a question: what purpose does voluntary
restitution serve if offenders are already required (as they are in many
cases) to disgorge what remains of their ill-gotten gains?
Voluntary restitution offers several practical advantages over the
current approach.
Since mandatory restitution only occurs after
adjudication, victims must wait and endure hardship until after the criminal
proceedings have drawn to a close. Indeed, victims may wait indefinitely to
collect. While mandatory restitution is a predictable consequence of whitecollar criminal prosecution, actual postconviction collection is not.115 As of
2002, uncollected federal criminal debt amounted to $25 billion, with
mandatory victim restitution accounting for about 70%.116 Between 2000
and 2002, criminal debt collection rates stood around 4%, falling from 7%
during the late 1990s.117 Even if collection rates stood at 100%, offenders
expecting prosecution or conviction would still have considerable
incentives to hoard, hide, or perhaps rapidly spend the funds they obtained
before losing access to them upon conviction.118 In either scenario, courts
114

See COURTNEY SEMISCH, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 (2009), available at http://goo.gl/OsqgAu (“A
substantial proportion of larceny (67.6%), fraud (65.2%), and other white collar (58.9%)
offenders were ordered to pay restitution as part of their sentences.”).
115
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-338, CRIMINAL DEBT: ACTIONS STILL
NEEDED TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN JUSTICE’S COLLECTION PROCESSES 2–3 (2004),
available at http://goo.gl/pdnfjO. Similarly low collection rates prevail in the context of
federal criminal and civil fines, with collection possibly as low as 10%. Ezra Ross & Martin
Pritikin, The Collection Gap: Underenforcement of Corporate and White-Collar Fines and
Penalties, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 453, 473–74 (2011).
116
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 115, at 2–3.
117
Id.
118
In response to a Government Accountability Office inquiry, the Department of Justice
explained that offender behavior reduces the pool of funds available for the eventual
satisfaction of criminal debt:
THE

During the intervals between criminal activities and the related judgments[,] . . . dispositions and
circumstances involving the offenders’ assets or the offenders often occur that create major debt
collection challenges . . . . [C]riminals with any degree of sophistication, especially those
engaged in fraudulent criminal enterprises, commonly dissipate their criminal gains quickly and
in an untraceable manner. Assets acquired illegally are often rapidly depleted on intangible and
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may conclude that victim harm is a sunk cost. When this is so, a judge may
order the offender to serve a stiff custodial sentence.119 If the judge
imposes such a sentence, two innocent groups—the offender’s victims and
the taxpaying public—must pay a price.120
By encouraging voluntary restitution, courts will reduce collection
problems and encourage more prompt and complete victim redress. While
perpetrators of massive frauds may cause losses that far exceed their illgotten gains (and will hence be unable to make sufficient restitution), many
white-collar offenders are capable of repaying their victims.121 These
offenders may choose to make restitution more fully and more promptly if
they know that their repayments will be considered as a mitigating factor in
their sentencings. In this way, restitution-based mitigation gives judges a
more powerful sentencing tool, improving the effectiveness of punishment,
rather than reduplicating punishments already in use.
excess ‘lifestyle’ expenses. Specifically, travel, entertainment, gambling, clothes, and gifts are
high on the list of means to rapidly dispose of such assets. Moreover, money stolen from others
is rarely invested into easily located or exchanged assets, such as readily identifiable bank
accounts, stocks or bonds, or real property.

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-80, CRIMINAL DEBT: COURT-ORDERED
RESTITUTION AMOUNTS FAR EXCEED LIKELY COLLECTIONS FOR THE CRIME VICTIMS IN
SELECTED FINANCIAL FRAUD CASES 11–12 (2005), available at http://goo.gl/ZH47RI. In
some cases, offenders created trusts and conveyed assets before conviction. Id. at 13. These
transfers, even if traceable and revocable, create further collection problems for law
enforcement. Id.
119
See United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 804 (9th Cir. 2012). While nothing in the
opinion suggests that the defendant in Rangel liquidated his assets in advance of conviction,
it is clear only that the defendant could not repay his victims after incurring massive losses.
Id. at 799. Many offenders who have amassed large surpluses from their crimes and
accordingly anticipate asset seizure upon conviction have only weak incentives, if any at all,
to serve as responsible stewards of their ill-gotten gains and avoid winding up in the same
situation as the Rangel defendant at the time of his sentencing.
120
Attempts to estimate the cost of crime reduction that is “purchased,” as it were,
through increased incarceration, reach widely varying results. Cf. Raymond Paternoster,
How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 765, 80203 (2010) (concluding that “we can attribute anywhere from 20% to
30% of the crime drop to imprisonment,” and that “both deterrence and incapacitation are
equally compelling explanations” for this effect); Louis Michael Seidman, Hyperincarceration and Strategies of Disruption: Is There a Way Out?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 109,
113 & n.19 (2011) (noting that scholars have estimated the crime rate reduction attributable
to increased incarceration during the 1990s at between 2% and 5%, though others disagree).
Recidivism rates in the white-collar context are lowest among all categories of crime. See
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 82, at 20 ex.1, 30 ex.11. Thus, if incapacitationthe
fact that would-be repeat offenders are kept away from opportunities to recidivate while they
are in prisonis responsible for incarceration’s crime reduction effect, it is at least arguable
that the marginal cost of reducing white-collar crime through additional incarceration ranks
highest among all categories of crime.
121
See United States v. Oligmueller, 198 F.3d 669, 672 (8th Cir. 1999).
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III. PROPOSED RULES FOR THE EXPANDED CONSIDERATION OF
VOLUNTARY RESTITUTION IN SENTENCING
To realize the benefits of voluntary restitution, courts and the USSC
should expand its use in the white-collar sentencing calculus. The USSC
should take the first step in this process by adding a new restitution-based
mitigation framework to the Guidelines’ sentencing calculation procedure.
This Comment proposes a framework that links modest sentencing
reductions to timely and substantial payment of lost funds.
To fit restitution into the individualized, evaluative sentencing
approach encouraged post-Booker, the proposed Guidelines amendment
contains a five-factor restitution sufficiency test.122 This test is based on
common law factors already utilized (albeit rarely) by district courts and
approved by circuit courts. Over time, courts’ use of this test would
facilitate their development of precedent that could guide the restitutionbased mitigation framework’s application to individual cases. To avoid any
conflicts with fines and compulsory restitution, and to provide offenders
with an incentive to promptly repair the harm they have caused, the test
permits courts to tailor the legal significance of restitution payments to
reflect the promptness with which offenders make them. Payments should
have less of an effect if made at the time of sentencing and more of an
effect if made earlier in the process.
Finally, courts could also provide an opportunity for offenders to make
or offer preconviction restitution payments without regard to whether such
payments are deemed admissions of guilt. They may do so by affording
preconviction restitution payments the protection of Federal Rule of
Evidence 408.
A. THE INITIAL STEP: GIVING RESTITUTION-BASED MITIGATION A
DISTINCT ROLE IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS

Given that white-collar offenders are especially responsive to
calculable incentives,123 an institutional approach to white-collar sentencing
that encourages voluntary restitution throughout the federal court system is
much more likely to be effective than one gradually implemented judge by

122
See infra Part III.B.1. Even if the USSC does not adopt the proposed framework,
judges could revisit the role of voluntary restitution by focusing, as the Rangel court did, on
§ 3553(a)(7) (the Guidelines’ “restitution” factor) when evaluating aggravation and
mitigation arguments at sentencing. They could tailor their sentences according to the level
of restitution provided. See Rangel, 697 F.3d at 804.
123
Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as
Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1094 (2010) (noting that “[w]hite collar
offenders . . . are much more likely to be the rational calculators that deterrence requires”).
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judge.124 Thus, the USSC has a special role to play in this reform.
Although judges may now make sentencing decisions based more directly
on their own case evaluations and penal policy analyses, all sentencing
decisions still begin with a Guidelines calculation.125 If that calculation
accounts for voluntary restitution, it will anchor126 the sentences at a lower
point. Such anchoring provides offenders with a fixed and calculable
incentive to act. With such an incentive in place, offenders will be able to
structure their conduct around the certainty that their restitution will at least
play a role during the first step in the sentencing process.
Action by the USSC is preferable for another reason: the reform is
most likely to be uniformly applied if it is incorporated into every
sentencing decision in the same way.127 The best way to do this is to build
into the Guidelines a restitution-based mitigation framework that would
apply to the initial sentencing analysis underlying every case. Such a
framework could consider the extent to which a restitution payment

124
Professor Julian Roberts notes that comprehensive sentencing guidance results in
more uniform (and fairer) punishments, defines and guides the application of sentencing
factors, reduces “intuitive” bias, and promotes public confidence in sentencing. Julian V.
Roberts, Punishing, More or Less: Exploring Aggravation and Mitigation at Sentencing, in
MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING, supra note 59, at 1, 2–4. Uniform
application of a restitution-based mitigation framework within the Guidelines will likely
further the same ends.
125
“The sentencing judge, as a matter of process, will normally begin by considering the
presentence report and its interpretation of the Guidelines.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 351 (2007).
126
“Anchors cause perceptual shifts by altering the background against which focal
stimuli are judged . . . .” Barry Markovsky, Anchoring Justice, 51 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 213,
213 (1988). Anything may be an anchor if it serves as “a reference point in the judgment
context” and is associated either with a stimulus or a response. Id. at 214. The initial
Guidelines calculation, as presently utilized in the sentencing process, is a response-side
anchor. It considers the stimuli underlying the sentencing decision (e.g., the offender’s
criminal history and the financial loss resulting from the offense) and provides the initial
starting point for a judge’s sentencing analysis. Accordingly, it establishes the basic
parameters of the analysis. Against these basic parameters, courts consider deviations and
either accept them or rule them out. See generally Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Confronting
Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest
Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming
2014) (discussing the role of Guidelines anchoring in the sentencing process and proposing
an alternative sentencing methodology intended to counteract it).
127
The USSC has used extensive empirical research to develop most of the Guidelines.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 37, § 1A1.5 (explaining that, in its
initial phases, the USSC “relied upon pre-guidelines sentencing practice as revealed by its
own statistical analyses based on summary reports of some 40,000 convictions, a sample of
10,000 augmented presentence reports, the parole guidelines, and policy judgments”). The
Guidelines thus incorporate existing sentencing norms and reinforce them.
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ameliorated proven economic loss,128 the timeliness and voluntariness of an
offender’s payment, and the extent to which the payment demonstrated
sincere acceptance of responsibility. On this basis, the framework would
prescribe modest pro rata mitigation for payments that meet a
predetermined general threshold. So constituted, the mitigation framework
would not undermine the uniformity goals advanced by Congress, the
USSC, and the courts any more than other aspects of the Guidelines’
sentencing calculus do. Indeed, it would lend clarity to an area of whitecollar sentencing law that is presently bereft of workable standards. Rather
than herald a return to the ad hoc sentencing standards of the era preceding
the Sentencing Reform Act, it will provide guidance not presently available.
An example of a proposed framework, to be incorporated into the
Guidelines’ § 3E1.1 (the “Acceptance of Responsibility” section), is
included below. Proposed amendments are bolded.

128

Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
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Figure 1
§3E1.1. Acceptance of Responsibility
(a)
(b)

(c)

If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense,
decrease the offense level by 2 levels.
If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a), the offense level
determined prior to the operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and upon
motion of the government stating that the defendant has assisted authorities in the
investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of
his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid
preparing for trial and permitting the government and the court to allocate their
resources efficiently, decrease the offense level by 1 additional level.
If the offense(s) of conviction require(s) a calculation of financial loss at
sentencing, and if
(1) The defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a), and
(2) The defendant has made a voluntary restitution payment resulting in
substantial victim compensation,
decrease the offense level by up to 2 additional levels.
Commentary
Application Notes:
(X). In determining whether a defendant qualifies under subsection (c),
appropriate considerations include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) The degree of voluntariness exhibited by the offender;
(2) The efforts required to make the payment;
(3) The percentage of lost funds restored;
(4) The timing of the restitution; and
(5) Whether the defendant’s motive demonstrates sincere remorse and
acceptance of responsibility.
Suggested thresholds for each factor:

Timing
Before
victim
discovery
After victim
discovery
After
charging
Upon entry
of plea
Upon
conviction
At
sentencing

Voluntariness

Efforts

High

Less
important

Medium

More
important

Low

Must be
arduous

Low
Low
Low

Must be
arduous
Must be
arduous
Must be
arduous

Percentage

Sincere
Remorse and
Acceptance of
Responsibility

Adjustment
0-2

Must be
nearly
100%

Must be
present and
sufficient to
satisfy
§3E1.1(a)

0-2

0-2, subject
to sufficient
“Efforts”
factor
showing
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If the USSC does not add a restitution-based mitigation framework to
the Guidelines, the benefits of performing voluntary restitution become
much more speculative, and the incentive for offenders to take independent
corrective action, in turn, becomes much weaker. But all would not be lost.
Even if the USSC does not add a restitution-based mitigation framework,
judges may—in the exercise of their post-Booker discretion—adopt the
foregoing restitution-based mitigation approach as a way of
operationalizing § 3553(a)(7) (the “restitution to victims” factor) and
ensuring that their sentences comport with the “sufficient, but no greater
than necessary” injunction of § 3553(a). Over time, the practice may win
over other judges and achieve widespread use throughout the federal
courts.129
No matter how restitution-based mitigation enters the sentencing
calculus, its use will achieve a variety of positive ends: more victims will be
repaid, offenders will have an incentive to accept responsibility,
incarceration costs will be reduced, and judges will have another tool with
which to operationalize the § 3553 factors (especially factor (a)(7)). These
benefits need not compromise the deterrent effect of existing sentencing
law. In the post-Booker world, judges may use their familiarity with the
facts of each case to craft a sentence that fits the crime and specifically
deters the offender. Owing to statutory sentencing ranges that reflect the
shifts in white-collar sentencing norms130 over the course of the past
twenty-five years, stiff punishments remain available when the § 3553(a)
analysis warrants their imposition.

129
The emergence of the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel illustrates how
such a shift might occur and also how fraught its path may be. See Kevin M. Teeven, A
History of Promissory Estoppel: Growth in the Face of Doctrinal Resistance, 72 TENN. L.
REV. 1111, 1126–57 (2005). The architecture of the pre-Booker Sentencing Reform Act
suggests legislative commitment to developing a limited “common law of sentencing”: the
Guidelines’ departure and review mechanisms permitted judges to deviate from sentencing
formulae and authorized appellate courts to approve these deviations under some
circumstances. Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a
Jurisprudence that Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
21, 34–35 (2000); see also Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American
Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 530 (2007); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing
Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences,
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1455 (1997). Owing, perhaps, to the development of appellate
doctrines disfavoring departures, common law sentencing rules did not flourish before
Booker. Berman, supra, at 51–56. After Booker, the individualized sentencing inquiry
required by § 3553(a), coupled with a more deferential standard of review, gives judges
more room—if not a greater incentive—to develop common law sentencing principles.
130
See supra Part I.A.
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B. DEFINING THE SCOPE AND EFFECT OF RESTITUTION-BASED
MITIGATION IN INDIVIDUAL CASES

As with sentencing in general, the maxim that a sentence should be
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary”131 should govern the effect of
voluntary restitution on an offender’s sentence. To avoid the “buyout”
problem, restitution-based mitigation should comport with § 3553(a)(2) and
inform sentences that are designed “to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense.”132 Restitution-based mitigation will align with this fundamental
principle if it operates under several constraints, each of which are present
in the suggested Guidelines Table offered in the foregoing Part. The
discussion that follows explains the importance of each.
First, any mitigation for offenders who voluntarily provide restitution
must not be so dramatic that it leads to disproportionally light sentences.
Excessive leniency may reduce the general deterrent effect of white-collar
punishment: when sentences seem trivial in comparison to the harm done,
some individuals might see a low-cost opportunity to break the law.133
Second, any mitigation should reflect the need for specific deterrence.
While some white-collar offenders are highly susceptible to specific
deterrence (as they may lose their professional positions, licenses, or
reputations after conviction),134 others, for a variety of reasons, may be
more likely to recidivate in the absence of a stiff sentence. Regardless of
the likelihood of recidivism, some sentences are so lenient that their lack of
specific deterrence value is plainly evident.135 In light of these issues, a
wider role for restitution-based mitigation in the sentencing calculus will
only advance the goals of sentencing policy if its use in individual cases is
governed by properly calibrated sufficiency standards that permit it to
realize its desired effect without undermining the goals set forth in section
§ 3553(a)(2). The alternative—reliance on ad hoc standards, such as those
currently used by courts, and the unpredictable results that follow—makes
restitution a wild card with few (if any) meaningful behavior-influencing
effects.
131

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
133
United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that
“[b]ecause economic and fraud-based crimes are ‘more rational, cool, and calculated than
sudden crimes of passion or opportunity,’ these crimes are ‘prime candidate[s] for general
deterrence’” (quoting Bibas, supra note 5, at 724)).
134
Podgor, The Challenge, supra note 8, at 740.
135
Martin, 455 F.3d at 1240 (explaining that “the message of [the offender’s] 7–day
sentence is that would-be white-collar criminals stand to lose little more than a portion of
their ill-gotten gains and practically none of their liberty”).
132
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The Guidelines permit judges to consider most restitution payments to
be evidence of an offender’s “acceptance of responsibility,” which triggers
a two-level sentencing reduction.136 In exceptional cases (i.e., those where
the restitution is “unusual and present to [a] degree substantially in excess”
of the level at which it is ordinarily present and hence “outside the heartland
of cases to which [Guideline] § 3E1.1 applies”137) the Guidelines permit
downward departures.138 Before Booker, judges relied on a few general
principles139 to assess whether restitution was exceptional in the context of a
particular case. These principles may still provide guidance to judges
conducting initial Guidelines determinations under the post-Booker
sentencing process. Nonetheless, the very nature of the pre-Booker inquiry
(directed, as it was, toward identifying how an offender’s behavior deviates
from the norm, however a judge might define it) made it difficult to
establish workable standards. The absence of mitigation-measuring
standards presents a difficult question: “how can one white-collar criminal’s
efforts to make restitution be extraordinary if other white-collar criminals’
efforts are essentially the same?”140 In post-Booker terms, the question
might be whether a criminal’s efforts to make restitution are sufficient to
warrant mitigation, either within the Guidelines framework or outside of it.
Here, though, as was the case before Booker, the inquiry is largely ad hoc.
A sufficiency test, applicable in the first instance to all cases where an
offender makes restitution, provides guidance and encourages the
development of a body of law that helps to answer this question.
Additionally, restitution-based mitigation must also encourage prompt
action by the offender. Ideally, it will also fit within the schema of
evidentiary rules in such a manner as to permit offenders to make restitution
payments without creating evidence that could be used to prove their
136
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 37, § 3E1.1(a) (“If the
defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the
offense level by 2 levels.”); see also id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1 (“In determining whether a
defendant qualifies under subsection (a), appropriate considerations include, but are not
limited to . . . (C) voluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudication of guilt . . . .”). A
two-level reduction might reduce a 6- to 12-month Level 10 sentence to 0 to 6 months, a 33to 41-month Level 20 sentence to 27 to 33 months, and a 292- to 356-month Level 40
sentence to 235 to 293 months. See id. § 5A.
137
United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 996 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see
also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 37, § 5K2.0(a)(3).
138
See, e.g., Lieberman, 971 F.2d at 996; United States v. Garlich, 951 F.2d 161, 163
(8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the “guidelines provide the district judge with authority to
depart downward based on extraordinary restitution”).
139
Typically, the arduousness of the offender’s efforts and the financial burden assumed
by the offender played a role. See United States v. Kim, 364 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir.
2004); United States v. Oligmueller, 198 F.3d 669, 672 (8th Cir. 1999).
140
Kannenberg, supra note 9, at 368.
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culpability.141 The following Sections suggest how to meet each of these
conditions.
1. A Sufficiency Test
Presently, voluntary restitution plays an uncertain and largely
symbolic role in white-collar sentencing. If an offender undertakes efforts
to pay back her victims in advance of conviction, her efforts might
demonstrate acceptance of responsibility142 and could justify mitigation on
that basis.143 No provision of the Guidelines directly addresses voluntary
restitution made after conviction, and no widely accepted sufficiency
standard governs the effect an offender’s restitution will have at any
procedural stage. As a result, an offender cannot anticipate whether (or
how) a voluntary restitution payment will impact her sentence until plea
negotiations (and sentencing proceedings) begin; even then, the effect of the
payment is uncertain. Thus, offenders who wish to make an independent
effort to promptly compensate victims may need to take a leap of faith
when doing so. This might be maximally significant in a moral sense,144
but it is not clear why maximal moral significance should be the governing
threshold, nor whether victims would prefer it to be so.145
A clear and broadly applied sufficiency test would help to address this
problem. Fortunately, a working model of one already exists. In United
States v. Kim, a pre-Booker case, the Eleventh Circuit considered
sufficiency factors noted by other circuits and synthesized a test for
determining whether restitution is sufficiently extraordinary to warrant a
141

See FED. R. EVID. 408.
This is the role given to pre-adjudication voluntary restitution by the Guidelines. See
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 37, § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(C); see also United
States v. Filipiak, 466 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the Guidelines account
for voluntary restitution payments and contemplate departures only in cases where voluntary
restitution is extraordinary).
143
See United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining, in a
case where the sentencing judge ordered the offender to pay restitution, that the mitigating
effect of additional voluntary restitution turns, in part, on whether that restitution shows
“sincere remorse and acceptance of responsibility”); cf. Lieberman, 971 F.2d at 996
(surveying earlier doctrine regarding the circumstances under which voluntary restitution
could show acceptance of responsibility and warrant a downward departure).
144
The effort to repay victims might not impact an offender’s sentence, after all, and
accordingly is more likely to show true contrition.
145
See Gabbay, supra note 14, at 465 (2007) (citing Heather Strang & Lawrence W.
Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 23
(2003) (reporting findings from a British study concluding that “when victims are asked,
they indicate a strong preference for compensation directly by the offender,” and sometimes
prefer a lower amount directly from an offender over a higher amount furnished by the
government).
142
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reduced sentence.146 Applying this test, a sentencing judge considers “[1]
the degree of voluntariness, [2] the efforts to which a defendant went to
make restitution, [3] the percentage of funds restored, [4] the timing of the
restitution, and [5] whether the defendant’s motive demonstrates sincere
remorse and acceptance of responsibility.”147 The Kim court joined a
majority of circuits in permitting downward-departing mitigation based on
extraordinary restitution.148 Although the Eleventh Circuit has rarely cited
the Kim decision since its inception,149 its test remains in force. Defendants
and prosecutors elsewhere have cited the test,150 but no other circuit court
has yet expressly adopted it.151 This is unfortunate, as it offers a superior
alternative to the ad hoc inquiry many courts currently employ.

146
United States v. Kim, 364 F.3d 1235, 1244 (11th Cir. 2004). The court drew factors
from United States v. Oligmueller, 198 F.3d 669, 672 (8th Cir. 1999) (analyzing timing,
voluntariness, efforts at restitution, and percentage of funds restored); United States v.
Hairston, 96 F.3d 102, 108 (4th Cir. 1996) (accounting for the percentage of funds restored,
efforts at restitution, voluntariness, timing, and motive); United States v. DeMonte, 25 F.3d
343, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) (factoring in voluntariness); and Lieberman, 971 F.2d at 996
(factoring in timing and percentage of funds restored). Kim, 364 F.3d at 1244.
147
Kim, 364 F.3d at 1244. In a concurring opinion, Judge Nangle noted an additional
consideration that might serve as a sixth factor: “[T]he defendants had no assurance that their
restitution efforts would be rewarded by the District Court at sentencing . . . .” Id. at 1245
(Nangle, J., concurring).
148
Id. at 1240 (majority opinion).
149
Of the three Eleventh Circuit decisions that cite Kim, only one discusses the
restitution test at any length. Compare United States v. Lorenzo, 144 F. App’x 833, 834
(11th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Simmons, 368 F.3d 1335, 1339 (11th Cir. 2004), with
United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005).
In Crawford, the circuit court ordered the district judge to apply the test. Id. at 1182.
Kim appears to operate most frequently in the background of sentencing decisions: as of
October 24, 2013, seventy-nine court filings available on Westlaw cite the case. See, e.g.,
Defendant Monty Ervin’s Sentencing Memorandum at 17, United States v. Ervin, No.
2:11cr7-MHT (M.D. Ala. May 17, 2012), 2012 WL 2476764; United States’s Sentencing
Memorandum at 24, United States v. Berkowitz, No. 1:07-CR-063-RWS (N.D. Ga. Nov. 17,
2008), 2008 WL 8083293. In one post-Booker case later upheld by the Eleventh Circuit, the
trial court judge analyzed the offender’s request for restitution-based mitigation under the
Kim test and found that the offender’s conduct justified mitigation. See Sentencing
Memorandum at 8–10, United States v. Anderson, No. 1:06-CR-091-01-ODE (N.D. Ga.
Mar. 2, 2007); see also United States v. Anderson, 267 F. App’x 847 (11th Cir. 2008).
150
Cf. United States v. Filipiak, 466 F.3d 582, 584–85 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing Kim);
United States v. Tilga, No. 1:09-cr-00865-JB, 2012 WL 1192526, at *3 (D.N.M. Apr. 5, 2012)
(same); United States v. Mady, No. 04-80408, 2006 WL 3147740, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1,
2006) (same); United States v. Kuhn, 351 F. Supp. 2d 696, 706 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (same).
151
Perhaps this is so because many judges still adhere to the Guidelines. Berry,
supra note 59, at 258; Bowman, supra note 66, at 361–62 & fig.4B. Finding the
Guidelines sufficient in this context, courts may remain unconvinced that the Kim test
merits a closer look.
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Indeed, the Kim test addresses nearly all of the dimensions of
restitution relevant to the policy aims the proposed reform might further.
Applying the test, the Kim court provided some guidance on how to weigh
and balance the factors. There, the timing of the offenders’ payments cut
against the voluntariness factor, as the offenders only made payments
following indictment and the completion of plea agreements.152
Nonetheless, the court recognized that offenders may need time to assemble
funds to make payments, and accordingly, refused to adopt a bright-line
rule that excluded all restitution payments made after indictment or
pursuant to plea agreements.153 In future cases, courts might view the
“timing” and “voluntariness” factors in conjunction with one another,
giving “autocorrection” less significance later in the procedural timeline
unless offenders needed time to gather the necessary financial resources to
make restitution payments. Similarly, as in Kim, the “efforts” factor might
exclude offenders who can easily provide restitution by virtue of their
personal wealth.154 Grounding the test in the actual loss and amount of
repayment, the “percentage of funds restored” factor might correspond with
the Guidelines’ existing loss table.155
Finally, the “acceptance of
responsibility” factor permits judges to consider whether, under all of the
circumstances, the offender’s actions represent a cynical attempt to secure
more lenient punishment or a genuine expression of contrition.156 The
thresholds required to meet each Kim factor could develop as the common
law does, allowing standards to crystallize over time and inform future
revisions of the proposed restitution-based mitigation Guidelines
provisions.
Two hypotheticals illustrate how the test might work. In the first
example, a variation on the facts of Kim, the offender has been indicted for
government benefits fraud. Before conviction, the offender liquidates most
of his savings and investments to gather the funds necessary to repay the
government; he also secures loans from his friends and family. Upon
conviction, the offender pays back one hundred percent of the funds owed.
In doing so, he explains the shame and loss of professional stature he has

152

Kim, 364 F.3d at 1244.
Id.
154
In Kim, the offenders favorably impressed the court by depleting their life savings
and taking out $200,000 in debt to pay restitution. Id. at 1245.
155
The Kim offenders received around two-thirds of the proceeds of a fraud scheme, but
they personally repaid 100% of the funds wrongfully acquired. Id. at 1238. The court,
applying this factor, noted that their restitution accounted for 140% of the “amount from
which they personally benefitted.” Id. at 1245.
156
Here, the Kim court acknowledged “the embarrassment, the humiliation, the shame,
[and] the sorrow” the offenders felt about their actions. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
153
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experienced as well as his efforts to remedy his wrongdoing. The court is
impressed by the offender’s efforts to gather the funds necessary to fully
repay the government and, accordingly, takes seriously the offender’s
statements about losing face after being charged with fraud. The court is
skeptical, however, as to whether Kim factors one (degree of voluntariness)
and four (timing of the restitution) favor him: after knowingly defrauding
the government, the offender waited until he was indicted to change course
and repay the stolen funds. The prosecution stresses this point and uses it to
argue against mitigation. After weighing each of the factors and
considering comparable cases, the court finds that the offender’s remorse
outweighs his delay in repaying the government, and reduces the offender’s
sentence by two levels from the Guidelines range, as the restitution-based
mitigation framework suggests.
In another hypothetical example, this time a variation on the facts of
United States v. Filipiak,157 the offender embezzles at least $2.5 million
from her employer, a real estate investment firm. She uses these funds to
make personal investments that yield unknown, but likely substantial,
returns. Before she is charged, the offender returns the balance of
documented losses, but responds evasively to her employer’s questions
about the extent of the embezzlement and never provides a satisfactory
accounting of the full scope of funds she misappropriated. At sentencing,
the court finds that she still has net assets in excess of $1 million, some of
which she may have acquired by investing the funds she embezzled. The
court applies the Kim factors and finds that, while the offender ostensibly
repaid the known losses voluntarily (and before she was charged),
satisfying factors one and four, she never satisfactorily explained how much
she embezzled.
Because the court cannot accurately measure the
percentage of funds restored, it finds that factor three weighs against the
offender. The court further notes that the offender, a wealthy individual,
easily made restitution, and after doing so still has a high net worth, thanks
(most likely) to the proceeds of investing her ill-gotten gains. This makes
factor two negative.158 Finally, owing to the offender’s evasiveness and
continued gamesmanship, the court is not persuaded that she has accepted
responsibility for her wrongdoing, meaning that factor five is also negative.
After noting the negative impact of the factors addressing the offender’s
candor and remorse, the court is torn between declining to deviate from the
premitigation Guidelines range on the basis that the offender has not

157

466 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2006).
Such a scenario also suggests that asset forfeiture might be used here to craft an
appropriate punishment. See McCaw, supra note 12, at 197–203.
158
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sufficiently accepted responsibility, or giving the offender some credit for
her restitution, which all sides agree has been substantial.159
Despite the offender’s continuing suspicious conduct, the court
acknowledges that the offender’s restitution payment has addressed some of
the harm she caused to her former employer. While some doubt remains as
to whether she has provided full restitution, the quantity is substantial
enough, and the timing of the payment early enough, to warrant taking her
payment into account as a mitigating factor. Here, as in the actual Filipiak
case, the court notes that the offender has not fully accepted responsibility
for the offense and imposes a substantial custodial sentence to “promote
respect for the law” per § 3553(a)(2)(A).160 Even while doing so, however,
the court notes that factor § 3553(a)(7)—the “need to provide restitution to
any victims”—tilts in the offender’s favor.161 Of course, if the situation
were modified such that it was clear that the offender provided a full
account of the funds she embezzled (and, in turn, returned them all to their
rightful owners), and undertook laborious efforts to obtain the necessary
funds, her mitigation case under the Kim factors would be stronger, and the
resulting sentence would accordingly reflect that strength.
2. Encouraging Prompt Restitution Payment
To encourage prompt action by offenders, it is important to establish
clear rules that govern how the timing of a restitution payment may impact
a sentence. At a minimum, the restitution-based mitigation test should
encourage at least substantial payment before sentencing, since the offender
will almost certainly be ordered to pay post-sentencing restitution pursuant
to the MVRA.162 Moreover, payments made at this point may have the
appearance of a “buyout,” and thus, if given excessive weight in mitigation,
might diminish the offender’s and the public’s respect for the law.
On the other hand, an offender (as in Kim) might have difficulty
assembling the funds necessary to make restitution before he is sentenced.
A bright-line rule excluding all post-indictment restitution payments could
disproportionately favor offenders with abundant liquid assets. To address
this problem, the rule could presumptively exclude postconviction,
presentencing restitution payments, and the offender could rebut the

159

This was what actually happened in Filipiak. The court sentenced the offender to a
term of twenty-four months (nine months less than the Guidelines range). Filipiak, 466 F.3d
at 582. The offender appealed. Id. Noting that the facts of the case suggested less-than-total
acceptance of responsibility, the circuit court declined to vacate the sentence. Id. at 584.
160
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012).
161
Id. § 3553(a)(7).
162
18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012).
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presumption by demonstrating that he took meaningful steps to gather the
funds necessary to make restitution before that time.
3. Voluntary Restitution as Evidence of Guilt
In most cases, restitution-based mitigation should only be available to
offenders who admit guilt.163 In the rare event that a mitigation-eligible
case goes to trial, the prosecution might seek to offer evidence of an
offender’s efforts to pay restitution to her victims as evidence of culpability.
Given that the goal of the proposed restitution-based mitigation is in fact to
encourage culpable offenders to accept responsibility and promptly remedy
their bad acts, such a result could have a chilling effect on at least some of
the desired conduct. If paying restitution amounts to an admission of guilt
(as juries would almost certainly deem it to be), then offenders with a bona
fide basis to contest the charges against them might be less likely to
“autocorrect,” choosing instead to take their chances at sentencing.
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 (the “Compromise Offers and
Negotiations” Rule) most directly addresses this concern.164 It bars the
introduction of evidence that an offender “furnish[ed], promis[ed] or
offer[ed]—or accept[ed], promis[ed] to accept, or offer[ed] to accept—a
valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise [a]
claim” as well as evidence of “conduct or a statement made during
compromise negotiations about the claim” when a party attempts to
introduce that evidence to “prove or disprove the validity or amount of a
disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a
contradiction.”165 The Rule applies to evidence of settlement negotiations
between private parties, but not to evidence of a negotiation “in a criminal
case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public office in the
exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.”166 It
also permits the introduction of settlement evidence to show “a witness’s

163

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 37, § 3E1.1(a) cmt. n.2
(“[Sentence adjustment for acceptance of responsibility] is not intended to apply to a defendant
who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements
of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse. Conviction by trial,
however, does not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction.
In rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for his
criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial . . . in each such
instance, however, a determination that a defendant has accepted responsibility will be based
primarily upon pre-trial statements and conduct.”).
164
FED. R. EVID. 408.
165
Id. at 408(a).
166
Id. at 408(a)(2).
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bias or prejudice, negat[e] a contention of undue delay, or prov[e] an effort
to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.”167
The drafters of Rule 408 intended to promote open settlement
negotiations, including negotiations in cases where an offender may face
overlapping civil and criminal liability.168 To prevent misuse of the Rule,
the drafters also specifically noted that it should not be used where a
defendant seeks to “‘buy off’ the prosecution or a prosecuting witness in a
criminal case.”169 Courts have applied the Rule to bar the use of settlement
offers to prove guilt in criminal cases170 and should similarly use it to
insulate good faith attempts to “autocorrect” in those rare cases where a
defendant compensates claimants (or potential claimants) and also has a
legitimate reason to contest the charges against him.
CONCLUSION
After twenty years of sentencing reform, the norms governing whitecollar sentencing have shifted: Congress and the U.S. Sentencing
Commission have established strict penalties for existing white-collar
offenses and created altogether new offenses. To the extent that these
developments have fostered more proportional and equitable
punishments,171 furthered the goals of specific and general deterrence,172

167

Id. at 408(b).
See McAuliffe v. United States, 514 F. App’x 542, 549 (6th Cir. 2013) (“A 2006 rule
amendment . . . conclusively settled a circuit split in favor of applying Rule 408 in criminal
cases . . . .”). The 2006 advisory committee notes explained that Rule 408 applies in
criminal cases because private parties who engage in compromise negotiations cannot
“protect against the subsequent use of statements in criminal cases by way of private
ordering,” and in the absence of an evidentiary bar, individuals expecting criminal
prosecution might “refus[e] to admit fault” or otherwise avoid settlement. FED. R. EVID. 408
advisory committee’s note.
169
FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note.
170
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 596 F.3d 852, 859–61 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In Davis,
the circuit court vacated the appellant’s conviction after concluding that the trial court erred
by admitting evidence of the appellant’s unsuccessful offer to return a fraction of the funds
he allegedly stole from his employer. Id. Prosecutors expressly stated that they intended to
use this evidence to prove guilt rather than to prove obstruction of a criminal investigation,
and the circuit court held that admitting the evidence for this purpose was reversible error.
Id. at 861. Nonetheless, evidence derived from settlement discussions may be admissible for
other purposes. See, e.g., McAuliffe, 514 F. App’x at 548–50 (concluding that the trial court
properly allowed the government to introduce a recording of a purported settlement
negotiation to prove the offender’s “knowledge of and participation in illegal acts—in other
words, his state of mind”).
171
See STEER, supra note 26, at 1–2.
172
They have furthered the goals of specific and general deterrence by imposing
punishments that make white-collar crimes more costly.
168
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and incapacitated dangerous individuals,173 they are laudable. But low
criminal debt collection rates demonstrate that victim interests now need
closer attention. White-collar crime causes economic harm in the first
instance, and incarceration alone, though surely useful for the purposes of
communicating society’s disapproval of bad acts, may not remedy victims’
harm as fully as might be possible under the circumstances. As long as
criminal debt collection rates remain at low levels, plenty of room for
improvement remains. Voluntary restitution may remedy the harm caused
by white-collar crime at the place where its effects have been most directly
felt. In addition to improving victims’ economic well-being, voluntary
restitution may also be morally significant. An affirmative compensatory
act by the offender may demonstrate acceptance of responsibility and
restore social trust and goodwill, especially if the offender must work
arduously to provide it. While a court may (and in many circumstances,
must) order restitution, it can only do so after an adjudication of guilt.
Ordering restitution at sentencing does not require the offender to accept
any responsibility for his crime and does not discourage financial
gamesmanship by offenders. Under the present sentencing structure, these
unfortunate consequences are inevitable.
Seeking to improve the existing sentencing process by encouraging
victim remediation and discouraging gamesmanship by offenders, this
Comment’s proposed reform sets forth potential components of a workable
reform. It avoids the “buyout” problem by limiting mitigation and linking it
to existing Guidelines sentences. It is governed by context-sensitive
sufficiency standards, encourages prompt action by offenders, and
complements existing punitive devices.174 By providing offenders with the
opportunity to take self-correcting action, it may encourage rehabilitation.
Rather than waiting to see what the judge might order, offenders could own
up to their crimes and take steps to repair the damage they have caused. In
giving judges a set of criteria they may use to mitigate an offender’s
sentence when an offender has taken meaningful steps to repair the harm he
has caused, the proposed reform leads to more economically efficient
results: redress places the victims in a better position than they would have
been in if the offenders had no incentive to promptly repay them, and the

173
They have incapacitated dangerous individuals by punishing repeat offenders more
severely.
174
In other words, an offender’s restitution payment should be considered to mitigate
only to the extent that it conforms to the priority order set by statutes and federal law. It
should not supplant or preclude the payment of fines or back taxes, or substitute for the
repossession of assets where statutes require such measures in the first instance. Rather,
voluntary restitution should be considered in mitigation in those situations where
compulsory restitution or incarceration may be used to punish the offender.
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government incurs fewer expenses in connection with enforcing criminal
judgments and incarceration.
No punishment, including long carceral sentences, can ever undo a
crime. Many punishments, however, can serve a corrective purpose. By
encouraging white-collar offenders to “autocorrect,” this Comment’s
proposed restitution-based mitigation framework would permit the USSC
and courts to build on past reforms and take an additional step toward
“calibrat[ing] white-collar sentences.”175
For victims and for the
overstressed federal criminal justice system, such a step is long overdue.

175

Bibas, supra note 5, at 739.

